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PRICE-EARNINGS RELATIVES - A NEW TWIST TO THE LOW-MULTIPLE STRATEGY 
Latest computer research findings show· that there is a new investment 
strategy which promises the investor high returns at relatively low risk. 
This strategy is a new twist to the now popular but once forbidden low P/E 
multiple approach. The new twist is called the price-earnings relative or 
PER. As we will see later, our study shows that a low PER investment strategy 
can produce higher returns at lower risk than the more traditional approaches. 
In order to better understand how and why the PER investment approach works, 
it is important to trace some of the events leading up to the PER concept! 
Once upon a time, in a long-forgotten era of soaring stock prices, an as-
tute disciple of fundamental sec.urities analysis cautioned that many investors 
and analysts alike were existing in an investment fairyland. In his 1949 
classic, The Intelligent Investor, Benjaiiii.n Graham maintained that stockmarket 
participants are inclined to overreact to future corporate prospects. In the 
process, these Qtherwise rational investors would often engage in a sort of 
"psychic" investing -- rallying around the most favorably viewed stocks, and 
frequently chasing those coveted issues to exorbitant prices based on the 
premise that another buyer could always be found at an even higher level. 
Meanwhile, the least attractively regarded stocks would be relegated to an in-
vestors' graveyard-- to be avoided regardless of price. 
Such overreactions manifest in the phenomenon that the fashionable stocks 
are propelled to prices that are too steep, while the banished issues are apa-
thetically priced too low. This disparity becomes most evident when observing 
the price-earnings ratios of the two categories of stocks. The fashionable 
stocks tend to sport lofty P/E ratios while the less popular issues possess 
meager multiples. 
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'Two-Tier' Market Revisited 
The now infamous two-tier market of 1971-1972 provides recent confirma-
tion of Graham's overreaction theory. During that time investors singled out 
approximately four dozen large-capitalization, above-average growth companies 
and engaged in a titanic bidding warfare for those precious securities. 
Prices of these "nifty fifty" growth stocks escalated to dizzying heights. In 
1972, Avon, Disney, and Polaroid, to name a few, all sold at prices in excess 
of 80 times earnings. At one point, the total market value of Avon exceeded 
that of the entire domestic steel industry. But price was not a major con-
. 
cern. No matter how much you paid for one of these elite issues, you would 
prosper -- or so the theory went -- because growth would eventually bail you 
out. Of course, we all know that this speculative binge went the way of prior 
manias. The collapse of the nifty fifty was sudden and cruel. By 1974, Avon, 
Disney, and Polaroid had lost more than eighty per·cent of their peak market 
values. Even regal IBM, the epitome of a "one-decision" stock, had more than 
half of its market value lopped off. 
The two-tier market was certainly not the first speculative binge, nor 
will lt likely be the last. But it does vividly portray the risks of driving 
prices to extremes -- no matter how attractive the underlying company. More 
and more market analysts, having witnessed the brutality in which speculative 
bubbles are burst, subscribe to Graham's stringent valuation theories. In 
particular, some of these analysts, who are labeled "contrarians," advocate 
that investors should confine their purchases to quality, low-multiple stocks 
while avoiding high-P/E issues. These contrarians . argue that high-multiple 
stocks have considerably greater downside price risk than do their low-P/E 
counterparts. In eff~ct, a low-P/E stock has already been pushed to the 
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depths of price so how much lower can it go? On the other hand, a high multi-
ple stock that falls from investor favor has a considerable distance to de-
cline before it reaches a more normal multiple level. 
If Graham's early overreaction hypothesis is valid, then the basically 
ignored lowest P/E stocks are presumably over-depressed and should eventually 
adjust upwards to a more normal level. Such adjustments should lead to 
higher-than-normal returns. On the other hand, the over-inflated, high--PE's 
should at some time collapse to lower and more realistic levels, thereby de-
pressing returns from these stocks. 
Staying Out of Trouble 
An investment strategy that reflects a contrarian's viewpoint is one that 
concentrates on a diversified portfolio of selected low-multiple issues. The 
advantages of this strategy are twofold. First, only stocks with depressed 
P /E 's will be se=-lected -- thus limiting downside price risk (assuming, of 
course that these firms are chosen based upon their ability to maintain earn-
ings at a respectable level). Second, high-multiple securities are avoided. 
There£ore, the investor removes the possibility of experiencing a staggering 
loss due to a multiple collapse. While the investor runs the risk of owning a 
stock that may be a lackluster performer for some time, he nevertheless stays 
out of serious financial trouble by avoiding those high-P/E stocks that have 
the potential of nosediving once the fickle investment community becomes dis-
enchanted with them• 
The overriding question becomes: can one really achieve higher-than-
normal returns by adhering to a diversified, low-multiple investment strategy? 
Indeed, two earlier Barron's articles ("Watch Those Multiples," February 28, 
1977 and "For Widows and Orphans," December 3, 1979) address this query and 
document the notion that low P/E portfolios over long time periods actually do 
-------- ----------------------------------------------
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outperform both the market and. high-P/E portfolios. Other studies published 
in academic and practitioner journals -have arrived at similar conclusions. 
These studies, however, have often been criticized because they do not 
con1ider two crucial factors that might bias their findings. In particular, 
prior studies neglect to compensate for the impact that risk and industry con-
siderations could have on investment returns. We shall attempt to devise an 
investment strategy that compensates for these possible biases. But first., we 
shall take a look at how these non-PIE-related factors could influence port-
folio returns. 
Rilk/Return Tradeoffs 
Several studies made during the 60's by competent professionals presented 
the first evidence that low-P/E stocks generate abnormally high returns. 
These studies revealed that indeed investors did overreact to corporate pros-
pects by attributing lower-than-deserved P/E's to less glamourous stocks; how-
ever, he also discovered that the market eventually tended to rectify this 
overreaction by pushing the multiple to a higher and more realistic level. 
The results indicated that in the long run the lowest ratio stocks not only 
dramatically outperformed the higher P/E stocks, but also significantly "beat 
the market. 
At approximately the same time that these low-P/E studies were appearing, 
other professionals pointed out that some stocks are riskier than others. 
They theorized that the return one can expect on any stock should be propor-
tional to how risky the stock is in relation to the average stock. The now 
well-known "beta" factor was developed to gauge the risk of a particular 
stock. A beta of one designates a stock with price volatility comparable to 
that of the market, while a beta larger than one indicates volatility that is 
greater than the market's (vice versa for a beta less than one). 
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Thus, an investor would logically .expect that a particular stock would 
generate a higher-than-market return if that stock has a h;igher-than-market 
beta. Accordingly, the findings that low-P/E stocks produce higher-than-
market returns is not surprising if one believes that these low-ratio stocks 
are riskier (high betas) than the market average. In that event the excess 
returns generated by low-multiple stocks would merely be a deserved risk pre-
mium that the investor demands for tolerating greater-than-market risk. In 
this sense, observing that low-multiple stocks outperform the market averages 
would be no more unusual or unexpected than seeing that A-rated bonds provide 
higher yields than AAA-rated issues. ·Unfortunately, none of these low-P/E 
studies incorporated risk considerations into their analyses and therefore 
their discovery of high returns for low-P/E stocks was not necessarily signif-
icant. 
Industry Biases 
Another possible deficiency of these earlier P/E studies was that they 
neglected to compensate for the tremendous influence that industry considera-
tions can have on price--earnings ratios. Some industries, such as the one 
comprised of food companies are typified by low-multiple securities, whereas 
other industries (electronics, for example) contain numerous high-P /E issues •. 
Thus a typical low-P/E portfolio would most likely contain proportionately 
more securities from characteristically low-ratio industries, while containing 
only a sparse sampling of stocks from high-P/E industries. Accordingly, most 
food company stocks, for example, would tend to cluster in low-P/E portfolios, 
whereas most electronics stocks would be entered into high-P/E portfolios. 
The implications of this type of portfolio construction are obvious: any 
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detected return differences between high- and low-multiple portfolios might be 
caused by variances in industry performance rather than- the P/E level. 
Our study compensates for industry bias by introducing a new type of 
earnings multiple which we shall call the price-earnings _relative, or PER. 
The PER is an index of the P/E ratio of a stock relative to that of its in-
dus try, and is calculated by dividing a given stock's P/E by the average P/E 
ratio for its related industry group. A PER of 1.0, therefore, would indicate 
that a stock's P/E is typical of its industry average. In this manner, an 
electronics stock with a P/E ratio of 10, for example, could have a lower PER 
t han a food stock with a P/E of 6 because the electronics stock's P/E is lower 
r e lative to its industry norm. 
Looking Back 
We undertook a study to determine if portfolios comprised of low-PER se-
curities do indeed provide superior rates of return. We analyzed forty stocks 
from each of the electronics (high P/E's), paper/container (average P/E's), 
and food (low P/E's) industries. The P/E ratio of each observed security was 
compu~ed quarterly from the beginning of 1970 to mid-year 1980. The numerator 
of this ratio is the closing market price per share at the end of the quarter 
and the denominator is the sum of the four most recently reported quarterly 
earnings per common share (fully diluted). We then converted the resultant 
P/E to a PER by dividing by the appropriate industry average P/E for that 
quart er. 
We arranged these stocks into ten separate portfolios, or deciles, ac-
cording to thei r PER magnitude. Decile one contains the lowest 10% of PER's; 
decile ten the hi ghest. Bot h cap.ital gains (losses ) a nd di vidends were i n-
cl uded in calculating the quarterly returns for each decile• We repeated the 
experiment three different times. First, portfoli os were adjusted every three 
ANNUALIZED COHPOUND RATES OF RETURN 
January 1, 1970 - June 30, 1980 
Switching Portfolios After Each 
Three Months Six Months One Year 
Annual Average Average Annual Average Average Annual Average Average Decile Return PER Beta Return PER Beta Return PER Beta 
. 
Lowest PER 1 31.64 • 48 1.07 26.10 .48 1. 07 23.69 .48 1.07 
2 18.52 .63 1.03 15.86 .63 1.03 17.45 .63 1.03 
3 16.64 .72 · 1.02 16.20 .72 1.02 18.78 .7Z 1.03 
4 19.12 .80 .99 18.42 .80 1.00 18.91 .80 1.00 
5 18.40 .88 .98 18.66 .88 .97 17.43 .88 .98 
6 11.36 .97 .97 9.52 .97 .97 12.92 .97 .98 
7 8.44 1.06 .99 9.60 1.06 .99 12.25 1.06 .99 
8 5.60 1.19 1.01 5.62 1.19 1.01 8.07 1.19 1. 01 
9 10.00 1.39 1.05 11.06 1.39 1.05 10.75 1.40 1.04 





months, then every six months, and finally every year to reflect shifts in PER 
ranki ngs. Thus, for example, if a stock's PER increased beyond the boundaries 
of its group, that stock would be "sold" at the end of the appropriate 
"ewitching" period and replaced with the .lowest PER issue from the next high-
cut decile. The "sold" stock would then advance to a higher PER decile and be 
"bought" for that portfolio. The accompanying table presents the annual re-
turn , average PER, and average beta for each decile portfolio. 
The Ri&ht Route 
A glance at our table reveals some interesting insights. For each of the 
three portfolio switching periods, the typical first decile stock's P/E was 
leas than half that of its respective industry norm-- i.e., a PER below 0.5. 
What does this suggest? A widely-touted investment axiom contends that a P/E 
11 no more than a barometer gauging collective investor expectations regarding 
a e tock's outlo~k. The higher the multiple the more favorable the prospects. 
Then doesn't it follow that decile 1 securities receive low relative multiples 
because investors envision less-than-desirable prospects for those issues? 
One would certainly think so. 
But how perceptive are these investors? Another look at our table pro-
vi des a surprising answer. Clearly the low-PER deciles provided superior re-
t urns as compared to the high-PER groups. For example, employing quarterly 
portfolio adjustments, decile 1 returned 31.64% annually, substantially out-
distancing decile lO's lethargic 2.20% yearly return. In fact, the portfolio 
r e turns declined consistently as the average PER increased. 
These findings may come as sacrilege to those investment gurus_ who preach 
a strategy of accumulating the stocks of highly visible firms with superior 
earnings prospects. But often too many gurus worship too few stocks. The 
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implication is obvious. Those sacrosanct issues may be driven to heavenly i 
heights while the castouts languish in an investor purgat~. 
Enter Mr. Graham and his overreaction theory. His message, though far 
from glamourous, is strikingly .appropriate. Avoid those revered stocks. 
Their prices, already reflecting outstanding growth potential, are too vulner-
able to any disappointment that may disillusion investors. To illustrate, 
look at decile 10 stocks. on average, these favorites sold at almost twice 
the normal P/E ratio of their respective industries. If investor expectations 
regarding one of these stocks wanes, causing the P/E to adjust to an average 
level, then the outcast issue's price would almost halve. Or even worse, if 
its new unpopularity is coupled with an actual earnings collapse, the price 
deterioriationcould be far more staggering. Apparently enough of the once-
heralded stocks of the seventies fell from investor favor to cause the high-
PER portfolios to consistently underperform both the market and the low-PER 
issues. 
But consider the low-PER securities. What worse can happen? These 
stocks have already been exiled to an investor dungeon. Unlike the glamour 
issues, bad news is expected. Such expectations have already depressed prices 
so bad news really doesn't have that much additional impact. In effect, these 
stocks don't have that much to lose. Just as the glamour issues were viewed 
with too much optimism, the outcasts were frequently regarded too negatively. 
Apparently enough pleasant surprises happened to produce superior investment 
returns for these outcasts. 
A Beta Way 
So low-PER stocks produce above-average returns. To determine if this 
finding is noteworthy~ we still must address the problem of risk. After all, 
higher returns are to be expected if risk is also higher. Risk has always 
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btUUl an elusive concept and possibly that is why it is often avoided in stud-
i lll ti like this. But risk is important -- maybe even more so than return. Ad-
m1t.te cl l y there is no consensus of opinion about how to define risk. Neverthe-
lc:UU11 an increasingly popular definition identifies risk as the potential vol-
&tLl:l.tY of a security's returns.. More volatility translates to more risk. 
As mentioned earlier, a stock's beta measures its volatility relative to 
that of the market. For purposes of our analysis, let's assume that beta is 
an •clequate surrogate for the riskiness of a stock. The higher the beta the 
art•ter the risk. Referring again to our table, one can observe a revealing 
pattern in the array of beta risk among the PER deciles. In particular, three 
faatures of these patterns emerge: (1) the high beta portfolios group at both 
the low and high deciles, (2) the portfolio betas decelerate while moving from 
dacile 1 toward the middle deciles, then accelerate as the movement advances 
towa r d decile 10, and (3) the average beta is higher at decile 10 than decile 
1. This pattern implies that the risk of a stock increases as its P/E ratio 
becomes more dissimilar from its industry average P/E. Furthermore, this risk 
• ppears to increase at an accelerating rate with the highest risk associated 
with those securities whose P/E's are farthest from the industry mean. 
Under these conditions, one would predict higher returns for the high and 
low PER portfolios (higher risk deserves higher return). An examination of 
our table, however, clearly shows that these results do not materialize. The 
mos t blatant contradiction to this idea can be observed by comparing the re-
t urns of the lowest versus the highest PER portfolios. Decile 1 substantially 
outperforms decile 10, even though decile 1 possesses slightly less beta risk. 
Thus, our results are strengthened. Low decile stocks outperform high PER 
securities and they do so without exposing the investor to additional risk. 
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We decreased the frequency of altering portfolio composition to determine 
if these same results occurred when portfolio changes were made less often. 
Our table shows what happens when semiannual and annual switching were used. 
Just like with quarterly switching, the lowest PER decile provided the largest 
return. Also, the portfolio returns generally declined as the PER increased. 
These results conform to those experienced by the quarterly adjusted portfo-
lios. 
However, another pattern emerged. As the frequency of portfolio changing 
decreased, the returns generated by the lowest decile group declined while the 
returns of the highest decile increased. As a result, the spread between the 
returns for decile 1 and decile 10 narrowed as the frequency of portfolio al-
teration diminished. Seemingly, more frequent updating of low PER portfolios, 
i.e., more rapid deletion of stocks whose PER's have advanced beyond the dec-
ile boundary, is useful for enhancing portfolio returns. 
Summing It Up 
Our findings show that the investor may achieve substantially higher than 
average returns by adopting a strategy of selecting stocks whose P/E ratios 
are low in relation to their industry average. A well diversified portfolio 
of such stocks yielded returns well above the normal premium predicted by 
their risk level. At the same time, such a portfolio exhibits less than aver-
age downward risk. 
The low PER portfolio should be reviewed each quarter (each time company 
earnings are reported) to monitor any significant shifts in PER's. Our expe-
rience indicates that about one quarter of the portfolio will need to be 
rolled over at that time. An alternative strategy is to adjust the portfolio 
once each year. Returns are lower here but are partially offset by reduced 
transaction costs and tax advantages. 
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